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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is quite clear that when the owner sold lots in Canal Street
Subdivision fronting on Martin Behrman Walk, designated as
such on the recorded plan of subdivision, said owner thereby
created by title a servitude of passage over Martin Behrman
Walk in favor of those lots."11 A public street constitutes a right
of passage in favor of the public, but the sale of a lot according
to a plan cannot be considered as a title which creates a private
servitude in favor of certain individuals as distinguished from





"If any principle in this most vexatious field of law is settled
by the jurisprudence, it is the rule that if any part of the date
appearing on an instrument purporting to be an olographic
testament is doubtful or uncertain, whether as to the day, month
or year, the effect of the incertitude or doubt about the date is
the same as if the instrument bore no date at all."' So speaks
the First Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Koerkel,2
wherein specimens of the testator's handwriting offered to
establish the year in which the testament had evidently been
written were held inadmissible.3 So holding, the First Circuit
chose to resurrect the Beird case 4 which, in this writer's opinion,
11. id. at 493. (Emphasis added.)
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Succession of Koerkel, 174 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). It
should -be noted that apparently no rehearing was applied for.
2. 174 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
3. The testament was dated "August 17" followed by the figures "19" and
two additional ciphers not readily decipherable but which the proponents of the
will, by the introduction of certain slips of paper containing figures purportedly
made by the testator, successfully established as being the numeral "51" so that
the year in which the will was made was proved to have been "1951" to the
satisfaction of the trial judge. The decision of the court is summed up in the
following language: "The date of decedentfs purported olographic will being
obscure, vague and uncertain and extrinsic evidence being inadmissible to resolve
its dubiety, it follows that the judgment of the trial court admitting such evidence
and declaring said will valid is erroneous and must be reversed." Id. at 221.
4. Succesison of Beird, 145 La. 755, 82 So. 881, 6 A.L.R. 1452 (1919).
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had already lost much of its weight,- rather than to follow its
former decision in the first and second Successions of Gaudin,6
which had not only received the explicit approval of other inter-
mediate courts of appeal,7 but had also the tacit approval of
the Supreme Court.8 No useful purpose will be served by re-:
viewing the jurisprudence on the subject. This was done by
the First Circuit both in Gaudin and in Koerkel, although dif-
fering as to the meaning of the rules announced and as to their
application.9 It is unfortunate that the First Circuit appears to
have abandoned the technique it had adopted in Gaudin in favor
of a rule the effect of which is to prohibit the use of extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of explaining an otherwise undecipher-
able symbol the meaning of which had been sufficiently estab-
5. In Succession of Lefort, 139 La. 51, 71 So. 215 (1916), although the ques-
tion finally resolved by the court was whether the numeral "1913" had been
actually written by the testator, the question which the appellant asked the court
to determine was, as quoted in the opinion on rehearing: whether "an uncertainty
or doubt as to the date appearing on the face of the instrument [may] be re-
moved by testimony as to when the document was or must have been written?"
See Id. at 78, 71 So. at 235. In answering this question the court concluded:
"We think we have sufficiently shown that the nullity of the will of the deceased
did not result from the possible uncertainty of the date of the will propounded,
but that the date could be made certain in the manner we have indicated herein-
above .... In line with all these authorities we consulted and examined the will
before us. We noticed the lines drawn across the paper upon which it was written
which a witness swore had been drawn by her subsequent to 1908; we gave due
weight to the date "1913", written by the testatrix upon the envelope containing
her will. . . . We are satisfied that the figure '2' is a 6' and not a 'G,' because
persons are presumed to use numerals and not letters in completing a date, and
that the figure is really a '6'." Id. at 83, 71 So. at 238. It thus appears that
what the court said regarding the maxim "Id certum. . .. " was more than purely
obiter. In Succession of Kron, 172 La. 666, 135 So. 19 (1931), the will dated
",January 11th/27" was held to have a date certain. Said the court: "So that
the words and figures to express the date make it certain that the instrument
was written on the eleventh day of January in the twenty seventh year of some
century." Id. at 670, 135 So. at 20. And sure it is, as the First Circuit Court
states, that the century was ascertained by the application of the 100 year pre-
sumption of death after a century of life. But what seems to have been over-
looked is that such presumption could not have been applied in the absence of
extrinsic evidence showing either the date of birth or the date of death of the
decedent. At any rate, Succession of Kron appears to have limited the effect of
the Beird decision for in Beird, the court held the will invalid, not only because
there was uncertainty as to the month and day, but also because of uncertainty
as to the century as well. Said the Court: "There is no word or symbol to denote
that part of the year which would tell the century in which the document was
written." See 145 La. 755, 759, 82 So. 881, 882 (1919), and cf. dissenting opinion
of O'Niell, J.
6. 98 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 1st
Cir., 1962), 23"LA. L. R.v. 266 (1963).
7. See Hardy, J., in Succession of Mayer, 144 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
8. The denial of writs in the first Succession of Gaudin (see note 6 supra),
would seem to indicate tacit approval of the appellate court's conclusion that
extrinsic evidence was admissible to prove the date.
9. Cf. the court's own analysis of its decision in Gaudin at 174 So. 2d at 217.
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lished to the satisfaction of the judge before whom the will had
been probated. Pertinent here are the following observations
made by the court in the second of the Gaudin cases: "So often
in the resolution of a difficult problem we lose ourselves in a
maze of modifying and even conflicting opinions on a particular
point. We become enmeshed in our own web of legalisms and
frequently the only respite is a return to the Codal Articles in
an attempt to get a new or at least a fresh approach. Seldom
.is this return without reward and the instant case is no excep-
tion .... Article 1588 does not demand that the date be written
by a particular method.10 That there must be certainty is under-
standable and right. But since this special requirement of cer-
tainty is not, as such, specifically demanded in . . . art. 1588,
any judicial criteria on this point should be made in the light
of Articles 1713 and 1715, concerning the intent of the testa-
tor.... The intent here has to do with the method the testator
customarily employed in dating papers. Resort to competent
proof is necessary and authorized under ... art. 1715 which says
that where the testator's intention cannot be ascertained, 're-
course must be had to all circumstances which may aid in the
discovery of his intention.'-1
Testamentary Capacity
Testamentary capacity must exist at the time the will is made
and therefore prior infirmities which might have impaired a
person's ability to read do not disqualify him from making a
statutory will if, at the time of the confection of the testament,
the testator had fully recovered. It was so held in Succession
of Glynn,12 and in two cases, Succession of Franks8 and Miles
v. Broussard,14 the court finds that the capacity of the testator
was not impaired because he suffered from the usual infirmities
of old age, including eccentricity and feebleness. In the Brous-
sard case, it was further contended that the will was null because
undue influence had been exerted on the testatrix by one of the
legatees. After reviewing the testimony adduced, the court con-
cluded that no undue influence had been proved. It is suggested
that such proof should not have been admitted in the first place
10. Cf. Succession of Lombardo, 205 La. 261, 17 So. 2d 303 (1944) ; Sophie v.
Duplessis, 2 La. Ann. 724 (La. 1847).
11. Succession of Gaudin, 140 So. 2d 384, 389-90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
12. 167 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
13. 168 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
14. 166 So. 2d 34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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and that it should have been given no probative weight if of-
fered for the purpose of showing the testator's motive for
making the disposition, for, under article 1492 of the Civil Code,
proof is not admitted of the disposition having been made
through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation. 15
Succession of Theriot"6 was a suit to annul a statutory will
written in the French language. Although the proponents of
the will conceded that the testatrix could not read French, they
took the position that she could read the English language, and
that this was a sufficient compliance with the provisions of
R.S. 9:2443.17 The trial judge found as a fact, however, that
the testatrix could read neither French nor English, nor any
other language, and declared the will null. On appeal, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal, having determined that the lower court
had correctly found that the testatrix could not read any lan-
guage at all at the time of the confection of the will, found it
unnecessary to pass upon the question raised by the appellants.
It would seem, however, that unless the testator is able to read
the language in which the will is written, he is legally incapable
of making a statutory will, since he must be able to compare
what has been written with that which he intends should be
written.1 8
Conflicts of Laws
In Succession of King, 9 a Louisiana domiciliary who had
executed his will in olographic form in the City of New Or-
leans died some years later at his domicile in another state, leav-
ing movable property only in Louisiana. The probate of his
will was opposed on the grounds that under the law of the
testator's domicile at the time of his death the will was void as
to form, and that under the rule that the validity of a will with
respect to movables is governed by the laws of the testator's
domicile at the time of his death the court had no alternative
but to declare it a nullity. Admitting that under the United
States Constitution the Louisiana court was bound to give full
faith and credit to the laws of the domicile of the testator and
15. Note, 24 LA. L. REv. 925 (1964).
16. 165 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
17. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1962) : "Those who know not how or are not able
to read, cannot make dispositions in the form of the will provided for in. R.S.
9:2442."
18. Cf. Debaillon v. Fuselier, 159 La. 1044, 106 So. 559 (i925).
19. 170 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 196).
19661
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recognizing the existence of the rule invoked, the court never-
theless held that such a rule is inapplicable where there is a
statute to the contrary. Accordingly, and in view of article 10
of the Civil Code2l providing that the form and effect of public
and private instruments are governed by the laws of the place
where they are executed, the will in question was valid.
Capacity to Receive
In Succession of Glynn,21 article 1481 of the Civil Code22
prohibiting those who have lived together in open concubinage
from making donations to each other except under certain cir-
cumstances, is strictly construed to mean what it says, namely,
that it is applicable to those who have lived together, and not
merely to those who live together or are living together in open
concubinage at the time of the donation. Accordingly, a testa-
mentary disposition in favor of a former concubine was declared
invalid although the concubinage relationship which had lasted
for several years had actually terminated some twenty years
before the death of the testator 2 3 and had never been resumed.
The fact that the former concubine had married a third person
many years before the testator's death did not remove the in-
capacity because, said the court, article 1481 only excepts "those
persons who, after having lived in concubinage, marry each
other." In other words, once a concubine, always a concubine.
CONJOINT LEGACIES - ACCRETION
Limitations of space make it impossible to give a detailed
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Succession of Mc-
Carron,24 in which the court again reviewed the jurisprudence
interpreting testamentary dispositions made in favor of two or
more legatees "share and share alike" or "to be equally divided
20. LA CIVIL CoioE art. 10 (1870) : "The form and effect of public and private
written instruments are governed by the laws and usages of the places where they
are passed or executed .... "
21. 167 So. 2d 533 (LI. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
22. LA. CIVIL ConE art. 1481 (1870) ; "Those who have lived together in open
concubinage are respectively incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos
or nortis causa, any donation of immovables; and if they make a donation of
niovables, it cannot exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate.
"Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule."
23. And presumably some 18 years before the date of the testament. There
is no indication as to when the will was executed.
24. 247 La. 419, 172 So. 2d 63 (1965). This case will be noted in a future
issue of this Review.
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between them" or containing words of similar import. In the
case under consideration, the legacy was to two brothers of the
testatrix "to be shared equally," and since one of them had
predeceased the testatrix, the heirs of the latter contended that
the one-half of the legacy that had lapsed descended to them
ab intestato under the provisions of article 1709 of the Civil
Code.25 The surviving legatee contended, on the other hand, that
the legacy in question was a conjoint legacy and that, accord-
ingly, accretion had taken place in his favor under the provi-
sions of article 1707 of the Civil Code. 20 In the alternative, the
surviving legatee alleged that the legacy was a universal legacy
and that, as the sole surviving universal legatee, he was entitled
to the lapsed legacy. The court held that phrases such as "to
be shared equally" are dispositive in nature constituting an
assignment of parts to the designated legatees 27 and that, con-
sequently, the legacies not being conjoint within the meaning of
article 1707 of the Civil Code, on the death of one of the desig-
nated legatees the portion of the latter devolved upon the heirs
ab intestato of the testatrix under article 1709 of the Civil Code.
The alternative contention of the surviving legatee was also
resolved in the negative, the court holding that, by definition,
the two brothers were legatees under universal title, and not
universal legatees, since aliquot parts had been assigned to them.
However, the court proceeded: "But assuming that the testa-
trix's two brothers were to be considered as universal legatees,
nevertheless, under the provisions of Revised Civil Code Articles
. 25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1709 (1870) : "Except in the cases prescribed in the
two preceding articles, every portion of the succession remaining undisposed of,
either because the testator has not bequeathed it, either to a legatee or to an
instituted heir, or because the heir or the legatee has not been able, or has not been
willing to accept it, shall devolve upon the legitimate heirs." (Emphasis added.)
26. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1707 (1870) : "Accretion shall take place for the
benefit of the legatees, in case of the legacy being made to several conjointly.
"The legacy shall be reputed to be made conjointly when it is made by one and
the same disposition without the testator's having assigned the part of such eo-
legatee in the thing bequeathed."
27. This is in line with what was said in Succession of Lambert, 210 Ia. 636,
28 So. 2d 1 (1946). Cf. Gregory v. Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 356, 49 So. 2d 423,
426 (1950), in which the court said: "It is true that the legatees, under additional
provisions of the will, were bequeathed the entire estate 'in equal proportions,
share and share alike'. But these provisions did not serve to transform an other-
wise universal legacy into a legacy under a universal title, the latter of which is
one whereby a testator bequeathes a certain proportion of the effects of which
the law permits him to dispose." (Emphasis added.) Succession of Lambert was
distinguished on the ground that the primary question there considered and deter-
mined was with respect to testamentary accretion, whereas in the Hardwick case
the question was whether the plaintiff was a universal legatee and as such,'en-
titled to bring the suit. The writer wonders what the decision would have been
if in Hardwick, the plaintiff had also claimed the right to the lapsed legacies? *
1966]
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1706 and 1709 (above quoted), one is not entitled to benefit by
the inability of the other to take his portion when the legacy is
not conjoint. Article 1706 reprobates accretion of a lapsed legacy
unless the bequest, in which it is made, is conjoint." 2 With this
dictum the writer is unable to agree. A universal legatee is
entitled to lapsed legacies not by right of accretion but because
of the nature of the legacy itself. A universal legacy is that
which confers upon the legatee an eventual vocation to the total-
ity of the patrimony of the deceased. It is closely akin to the
institution of heir of the Roman law, and consequently, in ascer-
taining the universal character of the disposition, it is not the
benefit received by the legatee, but his eventual vocation to
the totality of the succession that must be considered. 29 Thus,
in the presence of forced heirs, the universal legacy must neces-
sarily be reduced to the disposable quantum. Similarly, if all
the other legacies exhaust the succession assets, the universal
legatee will receive nothing. Conversely, in the absence of forced
heirs, or where other particular legacies have lapsed, the uni-
versal legatee is entitled, by virtue of his legacy, to receive all
that may be found in the succession, including the lapsed lega-
cies. As was said in Succession of Burnside,8 3 articles 1706 and
following of the Civil Code have no application in determining
the right of the universal legatee to caducious legacies for "it is
not the right of accretion that is invoked by the universal legatee,
but that other principle by which, as legatee of the whole, he is
invested with the right to whatever is not legally and validly
given away. ' 31 Moreover, article 1709 can apply only where a
portion of the testator's estate remains undisposed, which is not
the case where there is a universal legatee because that which
has not been validly given is included in the universality.
8 2
A universal legacy may be made to one or to several persons.
8 3
But when it is made to two or more legatees, it must be made in
such a manner as to confer upon all the same eventual right to
the totality of the patrimony of the deceased.3 4 And it may well
28. Succession of McCarron, 247 La. 419, 434, 172 So. 2d 63, 68 (1965).
29. See PLANIOL. ET RiPERr, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANQAIS nos 611,
614, at 641, 644-46 (1933).
30. 35 La. Ann. 708, 714 (1883).
31. Id. at 720. See also concurring opinion by Fenner, J.
32. Prevost v. Martel, 10 Rob. 512 (La. 1845). Cf. Compton v. Prescott, 12
Rob. 56 (La. 1845).
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1606 (1870).
34. Mr. Cross in his work on Successions states that the definition of a uni-
versal legacy in article 1606 is inaccurate and offers the following; "The universal
[Vol. XXVI
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be that where the legacy of the universality is made conjointly
the surviving legatee may claim by accretion. But would not
this be true also of a particular legacy or of a legacy under
universal title made conjointly to two or more persons? The
writer agrees, however, that where aliquot parts are assigned
to the legatees, the latter are not universal legatees. The writer
also agrees that if the disposition of the testatrix that the named
legatees were to share equally in the legacy means that she
intended to make an assignation of parts, and not to confer upon
each of them individually an eventual right to the universality
of her patrimony, then the decision is correct. 35
MISCELLANEOUS
Collation
In Jackson v. Jackson,36 one of the two surviving children
of the deceased instituted an action against the other attacking
a sale made to the latter by their father as being a donation in
disguise, 37 and in the alternative, as a sale at a very low price
legacy is a testamentary disposition. by which a person gives to one person, or to
several persons conjointly, the whole of the property which lie may leave at his
death, either in actual or eventual right." CROSS, SUCCESSIONS 204, § 140 (1891).
(Emphasis added.) But the testator should not be required to express in sacra-
mental terms that he intends to make at universal legacy. It should suffice if
it is clear that he is conferring upon the legatee an eventual right to the totality.
Thus, for example a legacy of the residuum after payment of particular legacies
constitutes a universal legacy. Likewise, the legacy of all the disposable property
of the testator would be a universal legacy because it contains in itself an eventual
vocation to the whole, for it is possible that the testator may leave no forced
heirs, and those who may be alive today amiy predecease him tomorrow, in which
event the disposable quantum is equal to the totality.
35. In the opinion of the writer the important question is whether the court
should adopt a rule of construction that the words or phrases appended to a
testamentary disposition indicating how the legatees should share makes the
legacy a legacy under universal title. It would seem that no matter whether
the testator makes an assignation of parts, if it is his intention that the legatees
should have an eventual vocation to the universality, they should be considered
as universal legatees. Of. Shane & Withers v. W\ithers' Legatees, 8 La. 489 (1835)
in which a legacy of 1/3 to A, 1/3 to B and 1/3 to C was held to constitute a
universal legacy. And see also Gregory v. Hardwick, 218 La. 346, 356, 49 So. 2d
423, 426 (1950) in which the court relying on the Shane case, stated: "Appro-
priate here is the case in our early jurisprudence of Shane and Withers v. Withers'
Legatees, 8 La. 489, it having presented for consideration a will in which the
testator, having no forced heirs, bequeathed to his wife and two sisters his whole
estate in the proportion if one-third to each. The court held that the favored
persons were universal legatees who succeeded to the whole of the estate of which
the testator died possessed to the exclusion of all others. The Withers decision
has never been overruled; in fact, it has been reaffirmed numerous times."
(Emphasis added.)
36. 175 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
37. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2444 (1870) : "The sales of immovable property made
by parents to their children, may be attacked by the forced heirs, as containing a
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and consequently subject to collation to the extent of the advan-
tage bestowed on the defendant. 3  The court found no reasonable
basis for disagreement with the findings of the trial judge that
the sale was not a donation in disguise inasmuch as the price
actually paid by the defendant was in excess of one-fourth the
stipulated value of the property at the time of the sale. 9 Plain-
tiff's alternative demand for collation was also dismissed, the
court holding, in accord with prior jurisprudence, 40 that collation
cannot be required until the succession to which it is due has
been judicially opened. 41 The dismissal, however, was without
prejudice, and the court reserved to the plaintiff his right to
assert his demand at the proper time. Since the demand for
collation can only be made in the succession proceedings, and
since the right to demand collation prescribes in ten years from
the death of the donor,42 the right to demand collation will be
lost unless the succession of the de cujus has been judicially
opened and the demand for collation is made within ten years
from the death of the de cujus.
Insufficiency of Succession Effects
In Succession of Mulqueeny,48 the testator had left a will
containing a number of particular legacies of realty, homestead,
stock, and three particular legacies each of $5,000 in cash. The
deceased was survived by one forced heir who had not been in-
cluded in the testament. The inventory revealed that the succes-
sion assets consisted only of the realty and of the stock be-
queathed in the testament, of $167 in cash, and of $9,000 in
donation in disguise, if the latter can prove that no price has been paid, or that
the price was below one-fourth of the real value of the immovable sold, at the
time of the sale."
38. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1248 (1870) ' "The advantage which a father bestows
upon his son, though int any other manner than by donation or legacy, is likewise
subject to collation. Thus, when a father has sold a thing to his son at a very
low price, or has paid for him the price of some purchase, for (sic) has spent
money to improve his son's estate, all that is subject to collation."
39. The conveyance being a sale and not a donation, the fact that the vendor
had reserved the usufruct for himself or that he might have divested himself of
all his property without reserving enough for his subsistence, was not violative
of articles 1533 and 1497, respectively, of the Civil Code.
40. Taylor v. Brown, 223 La. 641, 66 So. 2d 578 (1953).
41. That an action for collation cannot be brought before the death of the
donor is a necessary consequence of the premise that a donation inter vivos re-
tains its effect during the life of the donor and that the action can only be
brought by and against forced heirs of the descending line of the donor. LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 1503, 1236 (1870).
42. Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), 25 LA. L. REv.
983 (1965).
43. 172 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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United States Savings Bonds payable on the death of the de-
ceased to one of the legatees. After removing the United States
bonds from the succession assets44 and after reducing the lega-
cies .in order to satisfy the legitime of the forced heir, the court
held that since there were not sufficient assets to pay all the
particular legacies, the cash legacies must fail.
45
Identity of Legatee
In Succession of Rome 1 the court had no difficulty in deter-
mining from the testimony adduced at the probate of the testa-
ment, that the plaintiff was actually the person intended by the
testatrix as her legatee. Where the legatee's name is not given
in full, the court states, parol testimony is admissible under
articles 1714 and 1715 of the Civil Code to remove the obscurity
or ambiguity.47
THE COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS
Robert A. Pascal*
PROOF OF ACQUISITION WITH SEPARATE FUNDS
The Succession of Winsey is of more than usual interest. A
wife had purchased immovables in her own name through au-
thentic acts in which the husband had admitted the parapher-
44. Although the United States Savings Bonds were fictitiously added to the
mass in order to determine the legitime of the forced heir, the court had already
held that these bonds were governed by federal law and should therefore be paid
to the beneficiary thereof. Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963). The effect of excluding the bonds, therefore, is that they were not
subject to reduction as were the other legacies, in order to make up the legitime of
the forced heirs. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1635 (1870) : "If the effects do not suffice to dis-
charge the particular legacies, the legacies of a certain object must be first taken
out. The surplus of the effects must then be proportionally divided among the
legatees of sums of money, unless the testator has expressly declared that such a
legacy shall be paid in preference to the rest, or that the legacy is given as a
recompense for services." Cf. Succession of Berdon, 202 La. 607, 12 So. 2d 654
(1943), 5 LA. L. REV. 519-520 (1944).
46. Succession of Rome, 169 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
47. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1714 (1870) : "In case of ambiguity or obscurity in
the description of the legatee, as, for instance, when a legacy is bequeathed to
one of two individuals hearing the same name, the inquiry shall be which of the
two was upon terms of the most intimate intercourse or connection with the
testator, and to him shall the legacy be decreed."
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 170 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
